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From: Shiva Shankar <sshankar@cmi.
Date: Fri, Jan 1, 2010 at 1:21 PM
Subject: Doctrine of Universal Emptiness
To:
'... Nagarjuna utterly rejects the idea that his arguments, or any
other philosophical affirmation, are valid because of a foundation
that exists outside of, or beyond, language. ...'
From: Mircea Eliade - A History of Religious Ideas, volume 2: From
Gautama Buddha to the Triumph of Christianity.
Section 189. Nagarjuna and the doctrine of universal emptiness.
... As we have observed, the goal of these doctrinal elaborations and
mythological constructions that are characteristic of the Mahayana is
to make salvation easier for laymen. By accepting and integrating a
certain number of Hindu elements, whether 'popular' (cults, bhakti,
etc.) or learned, the Mahayana renewed and enriched the Buddhist
heritage, though without thereby betraying it. Indeed, the doctrine of
universal emptiness (shunyatavada)
Nagarjuna (second century A.D.) was also known by the name 'the
doctrine of the middle', corresponding to the 'middle way' preached by
the Buddha. Certainly, as if to balance the tendency toward
'easiness', evident in Mahayanist devotion, the doctrine of emptiness
(shunyatavada) stands out by its philosophical depth and difficulty.
Nagarjuna's Indian adversaries, and some Western scholars, have
declared that the shunyatavada is a nihilistic philosophy, since it
appears to deny the fundamental doctrines of Buddhism. In reality, it
is an ontology, paralleled by a soteriology, that seeks to free itself
from the illusory structures that are dependent on language; so the
shunyatavada employs a paradoxical dialectic that ends in the
coincidentia oppositorum, which in a way suggests Nicholas of Cusa, an
aspect of Hegel, and Wittgenstein. Nagarjuna criticizes and rejects
any philosophical system by demonstrating the impossibility of
expressing ultimate truth (paramarthata) by language. First of all, he
points out that there are two kinds of 'truths': truths that are
conventional or 'hidden in the world', which have their practical use,
and ultimate truth, which alone can lead to deliverance. The
Abhidharma, which claims to convey 'high learning', really works with
conventional knowledge. What is worse, the Abhidharma obscures the way
to deliverance with its countless definitions and categories of
existences (as, for example, skandhas, dhatus, etc.), which are
basically only products of the imagination. Nagarjuna sets out to
liberate, and rightly direct, the mental energies trapped in the net
of discourse.
From a demonstration of the emptiness, that is, the nonreality, of
everything that seems to exist or can be felt, thought, or imagined,
several conclusions follow. The first is that all the famous formulas
of the old Buddhism, as well as their systematic redefinitions by
Abhidharma authors, prove to be false. Thus, for example, the three
stages of the production of things - 'origin', 'duration', 'cessation'
- do not exist; and equally nonexistent are the skandhas, the
irreducible elements (dhatus), and desire, the subject of desire, and
the situation of the person who desires. They do not exist because
they possess no nature of their own. Karman itself is a mental
construction, for there is neither 'act' nor 'actor', properly
speaking. Nagarjuna likewise denies the difference between the 'world
of composites' (samskrta) and the 'unconditioned' (asamskrta). 'From
the point of view of ultimate truth, the notion on impermanence
(anitya) cannot be considered more true than the notion of permanence'
(Mulamadhyamaka Karika 23. 13, 14). As for the famous law of
'conditioned coproduction' (pratitya-samutpada
from the practical point of view. In reality, 'conditioned
coproduction - we call it shunya, empty' (ibid., 24. 18). So too, the
Four Holy Truths proclaimed by the Buddha have no nature of their own;
they are merely conventional truths, which can serve only on the plane
of language.
The second consequence is even more radical: Nagarjuna denies the
distinction between 'him who is bound' and 'the delivered one' and,
consequently, the distinction between samsara and nirvana. 'There is
nothing that differentiates samsara from nirvana' (ibid., 25. 19).
This does not mean that the world (samsara) and deliverance (nirvana)
are 'the same thing'; it means only that they are undifferentiated.
Nirvana is a 'fabrication of the mind'. In other words, from the point
of view of ultimate truth, the Buddha himself does not enjoy an
autonomous and valid ontological condition.
Finally, the third consequence of universal emptiness is the basis for
one of the most original ontological creations known to the history of
thought. Everything is 'empty', without any 'nature of its own'; yet
it must not be inferred from this that there is an 'absolute essence'
to which shunyata (or nirvana) refers. When it is said that
'emptiness', shunyata, is inexpressible, inconceivable, and
indescribable, there is no implication that there is in existence a
'transcendent reality' characterized by these attributes. Ultimate
truth does not unveil an 'absolute' of the Vedanta type; it is the
mode of existence discovered by the adept when he obtains complete
indifference towards 'things' and their cessation. The 'realization'
by thought, of universal emptiness is, in fact, equivalent to
deliverance. But he who attains nirvana cannot 'know' it, for
emptiness transcends both being and nonbeing. Wisdom (prajna) reveals
ultimate truth by making use of the 'truth hidden in the world': the
latter is not rejected but is transformed into 'truth that does not
itself exist'.
Nagarjuna refuses to consider the shunyatavada a 'philosophy'
practice, at one dialectical and contemplative, which, by ridding the
adept of every theoretical construction not only of the world but of
slavation, enables him to obtain imperturbable serenity and freedom.
Nagarjuna utterly rejects the idea that his arguments, or any other
philosophical affirmation, are valid because of a foundation that
exists outside of or beyond language. One cannot say of shunyata that
it exists or that it does not exist or that it exists and at the same
time does not exist etc. To the critics who observe, 'If all is empty,
then Nagarjuna's negation is likewise an empty proposition'
replies that his adversaries' affirmations as well as his negations
have no autonomous existence: they exist only on the plane of
conventional truth (Mulamadh. 24. 29).
Buddhism, as well as Indian philosophical thought in general, was
changed profoundly after Nagarjuna, though the change was not
immediately evident. Nagarjuna carried to the extreme limit the innate
tendency of the Indian spirit toward coincdentia oppositorum.
Nevertheless, he succeeded in showing that the career of the
boddhisattva retains all its greatness despite the fact that 'all is
empty'. And the ideal of the boddhisattva continued to inspire charity
and altruism ...
References:
1. Frederick J. Streng - Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning,
(Nashville, 1967).
2. F.I.Stcherbatsky - The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, (Leningrad, 1927).
3. T.R.V.Murti - The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, (London, 1955).
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